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Abstract 
Transition countries have, in general, experienced an increase in labour market 
inequality during and after the initial transition period. Theory and empirical studies 
analysing the causes and mechanisms of increasing inequality in transition economies 
identify globalisation, skilled-biased technological change, differences in access 
to schooling, the pattern and level of unemployment and institutions as important 
factors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased significantly in transition 
economies during the transition period and has been considered to be an important 
channel for the diffusion of new technology, managerial skills and new knowledge. As 
a result of technological and management expertise FDI may raise the level of wages 
in the host economies, improve working conditions and increase employment, though 
little previous research has focused on these effects in transition economies. Using 
the GINI coefficient as the measure of wage inequality a simulation analysis indicates 
that the net effects of FDI on wage inequality will depend in part on country specific 
factors, namely how large are the differences in skilled and unskilled wages, the skill-
intensity of employment in foreign-owned firms compared to domestic ones and the 
relative size of the foreign-owned sector.
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Introduction
The rapid growth of FDI, mainly since the1990s, is one of the reasons why the study of 
FDI is an important issue and has motivated scholars to develop a number of theories 
and empirical evidence to explain the causes, patterns and effects of FDI. This sharp 
increase in FDI flows has raised, among other issues, a debate about its effects on 
labour market inequality. It has been widely argued, both in the theoretical and 
empirical literature, that FDI brings host countries net additional capital, technology 
transfer, new jobs, increased management expertise, improving infrastructure and an 
improvement in the general business climate (Kinoshita and Campos, 2004; Serbu, 
2005; ILO, 2008). The key factors attracting inwards FDI in transition economies have 
been identified as gravity factors, unit labour costs, agglomeration, trade openness, 
the level of institutional development, legal framework and political risk (Holland and 
Pain, 1998; Garibaldi et al., 2001; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Kinoshita and Campos, 2004). 
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FDI has been considered an important factor for the reintegration of the economies in 
transition into the world economy because, unlike trade, it is a long-term transaction 
and foreign-owned firms account for almost two-thirds of word trade (Kolotay, 2010).
That inwards FDI plays an important role in growth and development is uncontested, 
however, the impact of FDI on inequality not only remains controversial, but, has not 
received the same attention, particularly from scholars of transition economies (Kaltani, 
2007). Studies investigating the relationship between foreign direct investment and 
inequality typically attribute part of the increase in income inequality to increased 
inwards FDI in host countries (Vijaya and Kaltani, 2007). Using evidence from previous 
studies and descriptive analysis, this paper aims to introduce the discussion of the 
impact of FDI on labour market inequality. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 FDI inflows into transition economies are 
examined and the pattern of these flows by sector and region analysed. In Section 3 
we discuss the relationship between FDI and labour market inequality. This section 
further analyses the impact of FDI on the level and pattern of employment and wages. 
In addition, this section presents a simulation analysis on the effects of a growth in 
foreign ownership on wage inequality in host countries, using the Gini coefficient as 
a measure of wage inequality. The last section presents concluding remarks on the 
importance of FDI on labour market inequality. 
FDI inflows into transition economies
The importance of FDI in transition economies and in the world economy has increased 
rapidly during recent decades. FDI has become a key element in global economic 
development and integration and an important element of the national development 
strategies of most transition countries (UNCTAD, 2003). Inwards FDI has increased 
significantly in transition economies during the last twenty-five years. As explained 
in the previous studies, it has been identified as a potentially important factor in 
explaining increases in labour market inequality. This investment has been mainly in 
the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and less in new assets (‘green field’), with 
FDI inflows being particularly stimulated by the privatisation of public enterprises in 
transition countries (UNCTAD, 2006). This section discusses FDI inflows into transition 
economies and the pattern of these flows by region and sector.
From 1995 to 2012, the inflows of FDI to transition economies maintained an upward 
trend, with the exceptions of 2009 and 2012 as a result of the financial and economic 
crisis (Figure 1). Transition countries increased their FDI flows by 25% in 2011 to 
$92 billion driven mainly by cross-border M&A (UNCTAD, 2012). Developing and 
transition countries increased their share of global FDI flows to 45% in 2011, though 
in 2012, inward FDI flows in transition economies fell to $87 billion (UNCTAD, 2013). 
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Global inflows are expected to reach more than $1.9 trillion in 2014, barring any 
macroeconomic collapse, and developing and transition economies were expected to 
remain a favourable destination for FDI (UNCTAD, 2012). In 2012, FDI inflows in the 
transition economies of South- East Europe almost halved as a result of decreased 
investment from EU countries who are the main investors in this sub-region. In the 
CIS countries, FDI inflows declined slightly as foreign investors were attracted by these 
countries’ fast-growing consumer markets and plentiful natural resources (UNCTAD, 
2013). The decline of FDI in transition countries in 2012 was, in part, due to a slump in 
cross-border M&A sales (UNCTAD, 2013). 
Figure 1 FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 1995-2012 (Billions of dollars)1
The uneven distribution of inwards FDI across transition countries has been noted 
(Kolotay, 2010) and the large differences in cumulative inflows are shown in Table 1. 
Very large inflows have been attracted by the larger economies, such as Russia and 
Poland ($418,982 million and $ 180,836 million in 1995–2012, respectively). Whereas, 
tiny inflows, less than $6 million over the period 1995 to 2012, characterize some 
low and middle-income economies such as Armenia, Macedonia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. In 2012, FDI inflows were concentrated in a few economies, with the 
top three countries (Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) accounting for 84% 
of the sub-region’s total inflows (UNCTAD, 2013). Even though FDI inflows to Russia 
declined by 7% compared to the previous year, they remained high at $ 51 billion. 
Foreign investors in this case were motivated by the growing domestic market due to 
reinvestments in the automotive and financial industries (UNCTAD, 2013). 
1 Source: UNCTAD-WIR (2013), based on its FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
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The five largest The five smallest
1.Russia 418982 1.Armenia 5791.6
2.Poland 180836 2.Macedonia 4345.4
3.Kazakhstan 105387 3.Moldova 3190.4
4.Czech Republic 97512 4.Kyrgyzstan 3110
5.Hungary 83500.3 5.Tajikistan 1917
Table 1 The five largest and smallest cumulative FDI inflows in economies in transition, 1995–2012 
(Millions of dollars)2
Figure 2 presents the FDI stock as a percentage of GDP, where we can observe that 
from 1995 to 2012 the SEE countries, overall, experienced a rising FDI stock as 
a percentage of GDP. The stock of inward FDI as a percent of GDP, an indicator of 
foreign capital penetration in an economy, increased from 2.1% in 1995 to 31% in 
2012 in transition economies. The increase in FDI is largely driven by the cross-border 
M&A deals, although ‘greenfield’ investments were the dominant form of initial entry 
(UNCTAD, 2012). The data for the countries presented in Figure 2 suggest that the 
inward FDI stock as percentage of GDP played a more important role in Montenegro, 
Bulgaria and Serbia, representing on average 68% of their GDP. 
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Figure 2 FDI stock as percentage of GDP in selected transition countries, 1995-20123
The contribution of FDI to financial accumulation has been particularly important for 
economies in transition given the resource intensity of transformation and the scale of 
required structural changes (Kolotay, 2010). This role of FDI in financial accumulation 
is proxied by its ratio to gross fixed capital formation (Figure 3). The ratio of FDI to 
gross fixed capital formation has tended to be higher in transition economies than the 
2 Source: Author’s own selection based on UNCTADstat database (2013).
3 Source: Author’s own figure based on UNCTADstat database (2013).
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world average and has increased over time (Kolotay, 2010). As illustrated in Figure 3, 
the transition economies of South-East Europe have relied more on FDI in their capital 
accumulation (17.8% average of 1995-2012) compared to CIS countries, where this 
comparable figure is 13.2%. 
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Figure 3 FDI inflows as percentage of gross fixed capital formation in selected transition countries, 
1995-20124
Table 2 presents the five highest and lowest ratios of inward FDI to gross fixed capital 
formation. It can be noted that even though Russia is the number one recipient of FDI 
inflows in absolute values, the large volume of FDI inflows are small compared to the 
size of the economy. Montenegro has the highest average ratio of inward FDI to gross 
fixed capital formation, however data for this country are available only for the period 
from 2008 to 2012 and much of that investment has been into the property market.
The five highest The five lowest
1.Montenegro 84.8 1.Albania 14.1
2.Bulgaria 40.6 2.Russia 10.9
3.Kazakhstan 35.3 3.Belarus 7.2
4.Georgia 30.3 4.Slovenia 6.7
5.Azerbaijan 28.5 5.Uzbekistan 6.2
Table 2 The five highest and lowest ratios of inward FDI to gross fixed capital formation in economies 
in transition, average of 1995–2012 (Percent)
4 Source: Author’s own figure based on UNCTADstat database (2013).
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FDI inflows partly depended on the extent, form and timing of the privatization of the 
public enterprises in transition countries, this investment was mainly in the form of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and less in the form of new assets (Tables 3 and 4). 
In the period from 2000 to 2012, M&A sales in Southeast Europe were highest in 2006 
(the value of net cross-border M&A sales was $3942 millions) with Croatia making the 
largest contribution to this performance with $2530 millions (Table 3). The end of the 
main privatisation process in SEE contributed to a decrease in FDI inflows. However, 
foreign investors are still investing in domestic market-oriented services. The data on 
M&As confirm the trend toward services (OECD-ILO, 2008). The share of the service 
sector in cross-border M&A in developing countries rose from 37% in 1987-2000 to 
58% in 2002-2006, whereas the share of the primary sector decreased from 11% to 
5% in the same period (OECD-ILO, 2008). The value of cross-border M&A decreased 
by a third in 2008, though the number of cross-border M&A transactions actually 
increased by 13%, mainly in medium-sized deals5(UNCTAD, 2009). In 2012, the decline 
in cross-border M&A sales caused inward FDI flows to transition economies to fall by 
9% (UCTAD, 2013). 
Value of net cross-border M&A sales, by region/economy of seller, 2000-2012 (Millions of dollars)
Region/economy 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Transition economies 629  2 796  2 393  9 759  5 379 -5 279  9 005 30448 20337  7 125  4 499 32815 -1 569
South-East Europe 252  1 031 972  1 286 489 955  3 942  2 192 767 529 266  1 460 84
Albania 16 - - 2 126 7 41 164 3 146 - - -
Bosnia and Herzegovina 46 25 2 0 110 21 79  1 022 2 8 - - 1
Croatia 153 676 644 612 66 360  2 530 674 204 - 201 92 81
Montenegro - - - - - - 7 0 - 362 - - -
Serbia - - - - - - 582 280 501 10 19  1 340 2
The FYR of Macedonia 37 328 5 0 4 0 280 53 57 - 46 27 -
CIS 375  1 765  1 421  8 473  4 890 -6 466  4 949 28203 19466  6 581  4 203 31356 -1 654
Armenia 0 2 40 25 132 4 - 423 204 30 - 26 23
Azerbaijan 36 - 52  1 420 - - - - 2 - 0 - -
Belarus - - - 2 5 4 -  2 500 16 - 649 10 -
Kazakhstan -98 13 49 53 428  1 474 -1 751 727 -242  1 322 101 293 -2 350
Kyrgyzstan - - - - 2 155 - 179 - - 44 72 -5
Moldova, Republic of 27 - - 19 16 - 10 24 4 - - -9 -
Russian Federation 421  1 584  1 206  6 743  4 268 -14547 6 319 22529 13507  5 079  3 085 29550 245
Tajikistan - - - - - 12 - 5 - - - 14 -
Turkmenistan - - - - - 47 - - - - - - -
Ukraine -11 164 71 194 35  6 386 261  1 816  5 933 147 322  1 400 434
Uzbekistan - 2 3 18 4 - 110 - 42 4 1 - -
Georgia 1 - - - - 232 115 53 104 14 30 - 1
Table 3 Cross-Border M&A by region, 2000-20126
5 Medium-sized M&A transactions are deals valued at between $30 million and $300 million (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008).
6 Source: UNCTAD cross-border M&A database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). 
Note: Cross-border M&A sales are calculated on a net basis as follows: Sales of companies in the host economy to foreign TNCs 
(-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the host economy. The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake 
of more
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Table 4 presents the value of ‘greenfield’ FDI projects from 2003 to 2012 where the 
value of greenfield projects fell by 32% in 2012 in transition economies compared 
with 2011, reaching $40529 million, the lowest level in the past 10 years. The value of 
greenfield FDI projects in CIS countries in 2012 was 260% higher than in the countries 
of South-East Europe where Russia contributed mostly to this value.
Destination region/economy 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Transition economies  69 796  52 153  62 005  50 225  80 460 124 606 58 388  55 805  59 546  40 529
South-East Europe  3 856  2 489  5 473  8 662  14 294  21 362  8 178  7 638  9 260  8 708
Albania 300 141 668  2 346  4 454  3 505 124 68 525 288
Bosnia and Herzegovina 971 527  2 243 643  2 623  1 993  1 368 283  1 253  1 287
Croatia  1 136 727  1 080 600  1 795  3 194  1 707  2 397  1 798  1 141
Montenegro 97 - - 344  1 794 851 120 380 436 355
Serbia  1 055 910  1 181  3 270  3 131  9 197  4 095  4 040  4 292  4 459
The FYR of Macedonia 298 184 302  1 460 497  2 622 763 470 956  1 179
CIS  65 652  49 489  55 367  40 584  64 832 100 429 45 811  47 149  48 306  31 397
Armenia 478 100 452 366  2 134 690  1 003 265 805 434
Azerbaijan  16 559  1 954  1 611 953  1 999  2 921  1 939 711  1 289  1 573
Belarus 892 222 887 923 487  2 477  1 134  1 888  1 268 787
Kazakhstan  10 254  8 768  3 152  4 176  4 251  20 344  1 949  2 536  7 816  1 191
Kyrgyzstan 301 54 179 81  3 362 539 50 - 358 83
Moldova, Republic of 142 611 451 130 162 163 488 301 320 118
Russian Federation  26 601  31 859  38 718  28 194  42 858  60 308  31 268  34 519  22 795  18 537
Tajikistan 617  1 247  1 157 43 327 226 570 3  1 076 669
Turkmenistan  1 407 805 12 11  1 051  3 974  1 433 458  1 926 8
Ukraine  4 137  3 439  7 236  4 972  7 185  7 686  4 561  4 061  3 094  3 192
Uzbekistan  4 265 431  1 513 734  1 016  1 101  1 418  2 408  7 560  4 806
Georgia 288 175  1 165 980  1 334  2 816  4 398  1 017  1 980 424
Table 4 Value of ‘greenfield’ FDI projects, by destination, 2003-2012 (Millions of dollars)7
Until the financial crisis beginning in 2008, South-East European countries made 
significant progress in attracting FDI (UNCTAD, 2012). The increase of FDI, especially 
after 2006, was driven largely by economic recovery, a better investment climate, and 
the start of association (and accession) negotiations with the EU from 2005 (UNCTAD, 
2013). However, FDI flows declined in 2009, with Croatia being the most seriously hit 
country, experiencing a fall of FDI flows from $6 billion in 2008 to just $432 million 
in 2010. During that period, FDI flows also declined in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Macedonia, though they increased in Albania as a result of the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises (UNCTAD, 2013). 
FDI typically increases exports through its impact on trade structure, both in terms 
of diversification and destination (UNCTAD, 2012). Trade liberalisation as part of 
transition process and through commercial agreements, especially with EU, has 
7 Source: UNCTAD (2013), World Investment Report (WIR).
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resulted in a significant increase of trade flows in most transition economies over the 
last decade (Grimalda and Meschi, 2008). The UNCTAD FDI Contribution Index 2012 
ranks economies on the basis of the significance of FDI and foreign affiliates in their 
economy, in terms of value added, employment, wages, tax receipts, exports, R&D 
expenditures and capital formation (the share of employment in foreign affiliates 
in total formal employment in each country, and so forth). According to this index, 
Hungary and Czech Republic were among transition economies with the largest 
contribution by FDI (UNCTAD, 2012). 
Wage inequality might also be affected by the distribution of FDI according to sectors. 
FDI can raise wage inequality if it is concentrated in skill-intensive sectors and hence 
improves the relative position of skilled workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). Analysing 
the sectoral distribution of FDI in South East Europe, UNCTAD estimations indicate 
that finance was the largest recipient in 2008, accounting for 32% of the sub-region’s 
inward FDI stock (UNCTAD, 2010). By 2008 the presence of foreign-owned banks had 
risen significantly in SEE, with the share of banking assets owned by foreign banks 
increasing to 90%, which was higher than the share of foreign banks in the new EU 
member countries (UNCTAD, 2010). By 2010, the service sector accounted for about 
69.8% of inward FDI stock in all SEE countries, however with substantial variations 
among countries (Estrin and Uvalic, 2013). In Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Romania the service sector accounted for about 60% of total inward FDI stock, 
whereas in Croatia and Serbia this sector represented over 75% and 81% in Bulgaria 
(Estrin and Uvalic, 2013). In 2011, services account for the highest share of foreign 
investment in most transition economies (UNCTAD, 2013). In only three SEE countries 
did manufacturing account for more than 30% of the total FDI stock: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with 35%, Macedonia 31% and Romania 32% (Estrin and Uvalic, 2013). 
The Republic of Macedonia is among the group of under-performers with respect to 
FDI, i.e. countries with both low FDI potential and performance8 (UNCTAD, 2006). The 
level of FDI in Macedonia remains relatively low (FDI share to GDP of just 4.4% during 
the period 1998 to 2011) compared to other countries in the region (UNCTAD, 2012). 
Analysing the period from 1995 to 2012 (Figure 4) the first peak of FDI inflows to 
Macedonia was in 2001 ($447.1 million FDI inflows) due to the sale of Macedonian 
telecom to the Hungarian telecom company MATAV. A second peak was observed 
in 2007, leading to the record of $693 million of inflows. Between 1998 and 2007, 
FDI flows increased due to the privatization of state-owned firms and acquisitions of 
major companies and banks by foreign investors (UNTAD, 2012). Until 2008, 38% of 
total FDI (equity capital) was attracted in greenfield projects, however FDI dropped in 
8 The potential index is based on 12 economic and policy variables: GDP per capita; the rate of growth of GDP; the share 
of exports in GDP; telecoms infrastructure; commercial energy used per capita; share of R&D expenditure in gross national 
income; share of tertiary students in the population; country risk; exports of natural resources as a percentage of the world 
total; imports of parts and components of electronics and automobiles as a percentage of the world total; exports of services as 
a percentage of the world total; and inward FDI stock as a percentage of the world total.
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2008 and 2009 because of the international financial and economic crisis. Macedonia 
being in the group achieving below $ 0.5 billion FDI flows experienced a decline of 
two-thirds in 2012. The ratio of FDI inflows to gross fixed capital formation reached a 
peak of 68.2% in 2001, but fell under 10% in 2005, exceeding 10% again in 2006-2008 
and 2011.
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Figure 4 FDI inflows in millions of dollars and FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital 
formation in Macedonia, 1995-20129
Countries with the largest foreign direct investments in Republic of Macedonia from 
1997 to 2008 are Greece, the Netherlands and Hungary (UNCTAD, 2012). However, 
these statistics on the origin of FDI need to be treated with caution since in some 
cases the nationality of the immediate and final investor may differ. For example, the 
state-owned telecommunication company was acquired by the Hungarian company 
Magyar Telecom, but this company itself belongs to the German Deutsche Telecom 
Group (UNCTAD, 2012). 
In Macedonia, foreign-owned firms trade more than their domestic counterparts. 
They export about 60% of their output, whereas domestic-owned firms about 40% 
(UNCTAD, 2012). Foreign-owned companies in Macedonia have enhanced the provision 
of services, such as telecommunications and banking, introduced new technologies 
and machineries, improved export capacities through contract manufacturing and 
paid higher wages than domestic-owned companies (UNCTAD, 2012). 
9 Source: Author’s own figure based on UNCTADstat database (2013).
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To conclude, FDI inflows have been important resources during the transition process, 
though its degree of importance differs across countries. The share of FDI inflows 
to gross fixed capital formation was high in countries that based their development 
strategy on FDI, whereas it was low in countries that neglected inward FDI in their 
development strategy (Kolotay, 2010). 
FDI and labour market inequality
The effects of FDI flows on economic growth and its determinants have been studied 
in both the theoretical and empirical literature, however the effects of these flows 
on labour market inequality in transition countries has largely been neglected. This 
section aims to introduce FDI into the theoretical explanations of wage inequality. Di 
Mauro (2000) argues that one of the major concerns of countries when discussing 
FDI is the impact of these flows on their labour market, both in terms of employment 
and wages. FDI influences domestic employment primarily through the: types of 
jobs created, regional distribution of new employment, wage levels and differentials, 
income distribution and skill transfers (Mickiewicz et al., 2000). 
FDI is considered one possible channel through which new technology becomes 
available in the host country and a channel though which a fragmentation of 
production can take place affecting the demand for skills. Therefore, the impact of FDI 
on wage inequality can, in part, be analysed by focusing on the effects for skilled versus 
unskilled labour. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Feenstra (2007) argue that firms 
in developed countries, abundant with skilled labour, are more likely to outsource 
their least skill-intensive activities, hence increasing the relative demand and relative 
wages for these workers in the host countries. However, FDI and outsourcing by 
multinational companies can also increase the relative demand of skilled workers in 
the host countries, since what is considered less-skilled labour in developed countries 
may be considered as skilled labour in developing countries (by local standards). Te 
Velde (2002) analyses the effects of FDI on the market for skills using a demand-supply 
framework. Workers are divided into two categories, skilled and unskilled according to 
education or occupation. The wage of skilled workers relative to the wage of unskilled 
workers is a measure of wage inequality. As illustrated in Figure 5, the demand and 
supply of skilled and unskilled workers depends on relative wages and technology. 
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Figure 5 Relative demand and supply of skills10
The relative demand for skilled workers is presented by qD and qS is the relative supply 
of skills. FDI can shift the demand for skills (qD2) in different ways, firstly whether FDI 
substitutes or complements local employment. For example, if the overall demand 
for labour rises and this is biased towards skilled employment then labour market 
competition increases, particularly for skilled workers, suggesting that they pay them 
higher relative wages (Driffield et al., 2010). Secondly, FDI may have transferred skill-
biased technologies, increasing the productivity of skilled workers, thereby increasing 
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, holding other factors constant. 
However, the speed of this adjustment depends “on the amount of absorptive 
capacity each country is endowed with. On one hand, if a country is endowed with 
high absorptive capacity it will be able to shift faster from one stage to the other one. 
On the other hand, if the transition period is shorter inequality may be a problem only 
at the beginning when the new technology enters the country” (Franco and Gerussi, 
2010, p. 10).
An increased demand for skills will raise the skill premium and offer increased 
employment opportunities to skilled labour, creating incentives for acquiring skills, 
as discussed in Snower’s model. Foreign-owned firms might also stimulate the supply 
of skills through creating additional skill vacancies and through investing in training 
of their workers. Foreign-owned firms can affect the supply of skills (qS2 in Figure 5) 
by offering additional firm-specific and general vocational training, they also typically 
offer more technical and managerial training for skilled workers (Aitken et al., 1995). 
Notwithstanding, this also depends on the size of the foreign-owned firm, industry, 
entry strategy and motivation for the investment (Te Velde, 2002). Colen et al. (2008) 
provide an overview of training decisions according to the type/motivation of FDI as 
10 Source: Te Velde ( 2002).
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follows. Resource or asset-seeking FDI may require specific training for only a small 
number of high-skilled workers since this is usually a capital-intensive investment using 
complex extraction methods. Whereas vertical or efficiency-seeking manufacturing 
FDI usually employs low-skilled, low-wage labour limiting the training possibilities. 
Market-seeking FDI typically organises technological or marketing training for local 
people, however only to a limited extent. Market-seeking investment can be also 
attracted by privatisation of state-owned firms, common in transition countries, which 
may require substantial training to improve market-orientation skills (Te Velde, 2002), 
even though transition countries have a relatively skilled/educated workforce. 
The engagement of foreign-owned firms in the training of their employees and 
general investment in education can create spillover effects on local firms. The 
movement of trained labour from foreign to domestic firms may contribute to the 
transfer of knowledge of modern production and management practices to their new 
employers (OECD-ILO, 2008). As a result of these spillover effects domestic-owned 
firms may improve their labour productivity by imitating the management practices, 
organisational structures and technology of foreign-owned firms, thus increasing 
labour market inequality in long run by raising the amount of skilled workers employed. 
If foreign-owned firms pay higher wages and expand overall employment levels, then 
this can force domestic-owned firms to raise their own wages “If, however, FDI affects 
labour demand in the same way as domestic investment, the role of foreign direct 
investors in transmitting productive knowledge is limited” (Aitken et al., 1995, p.2). 
Lipsey (2002) and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004) use efficiency wage theory to suggest 
several reasons why foreign-owned firms might pay a higher price for labour. Since 
foreign-owned firms invest more in training and have technological advantages, they 
may fear their employees moving to domestic competitors, transferring technological 
spillovers. To reduce potential labour turnover they may increase the foreign-employer 
premium. Other reasons might be that foreign-owned firms lack accurate knowledge 
of the quality of local labour and/or pay higher wages to attract good workers. In 
addition, more educated/skilled workers are usually in a stronger bargaining position 
than less-skilled workers because they possess key skills in relatively scarce supply 
and may have better negotiation skills in acquiring higher wages (Te Velde, 2003). 
Thus if foreign-owned firms want to employ ‘the best’ workers in a given location they 
will need to pay higher wages. According to OLI framework, MNCs tend to be larger, 
more capital and skill intensive, introduce more up-to-date technology and pay higher 
wages accordingly. In addition, institutional factors may provide incentives for foreign-
owned firms to pay higher wages, for example, in countries where the rule of law is 
weak, foreign-owned firms “may be more likely to comply with national labour laws, 
because of reputational concerns and consumer pressure in their home markets” 
(OECD-ILO, 2008, p.12).
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In terms of gender equity, foreign-owned firms might pay wage premiums and offer 
more job security to women relative to domestic-owned firms (Braunstein, 2006). In 
contrast, Vijaya and Kaltani (2007) argue increasing the mobility of capital lowers female 
bargaining power more than male’s, since women’s options in the market economy 
are traditionally more limited. In addition, “the potential greater opportunities for 
skill advancements presented by FDI are more likely to be offered to men, given the 
perception of their greater productivity vis-à-vis women”, which can lead to a rising 
wage differential between male and females (Vijaya and Kaltani, 2007, p. 87). If FDI is 
orientated to sectors with a high share of woman in employment and if these sectors 
are using low-skilled workers such as in the textile industries, FDI might improve 
opportunities for women and reducing gender pay gap by increasing the demand and 
hence wages of the less-skilled women in these sectors. However, the discussion of FDI 
inflows into transition economies in section 2 indicates that labour intensive sectors 
capture only a small portion of the total FDI in these countries. In addition, if FDI is 
benefiting the better educated workers it might also improve gender equity since, 
as Rutkowski (2006) and Pastore and Verashchagina (2011) argue, in many transition 
countries on average women tend to be better educated than men, even though they 
are concentrated in low-paid jobs. 
In order to bring together the diverse arguments of the effects of FDI on labour market 
inequality and to investigate the likely effect of increasing foreign ownership on wage 
inequality, measured by the GINI coefficient, a simulation analysis of wage inequality 
is presented in the next section. This simulation analysis indicates that the net effects 
of FDI on wage inequality will depend in part on country specific factors, namely how 
large are the relative skill wage differences in foreign-owned firms and domestic owned 
firms, the relative skill-intensity of employment in foreign-owned firms compared to 
domestic ones and the relative size of the foreign-owned sector.
Simulation analysis of the effects of increased foreign ownership on wage inequality
The GINI coefficient is a common and broadly used measure of wage inequality that 
can take a minimum value of zero (perfect equality when all individuals have the same 
amount of wages) and a maximum value of one (the case when one individual of 
the population holds all wages). Using the GINI coefficient, this simulation analyses 
the effect of FDI inflows on wage inequality in two parts. Part A, calculates the 
GINI coefficient for the domestic-owned firm and analyse how the GINI coefficient 
changes as foreign-owned firms of different types enter a market. Part B replicates the 
estimations of the first part adjusting the skill differential and employment differential 
according to PCA (2009) data11, where about 10% of employees in Macedonia work for 
11 Data used from People Centred Analyses (PCA) surveys performed in 2008 and 2009 in Macedonia. These surveys were the 
result of a partnership between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the South East European University 
(SEEU).
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foreign-owned firms. Ignoring any supply-side effects, the net effects of FDI inflows on 
GINI depends on countries specific effects, namely how large are differences of skilled 
to unskilled wages, how large is the foreign sector in a country and how large is the 
employment of skilled versus unskilled workers.
Part A
The GINI coefficients are calculated using the data in Table 5, where the wage variable 
is constructed assuming the same wages for all skilled workers (€450) and same wages 
for all unskilled workers (€100) in the domestic-owned firm. Here the number of 
skilled and unskilled workers is assumed the same in the three firms, whereas in the 
fourth firm an employment differential is introduced. In the first foreign-owned firm 
both wage of skilled and unskilled workers are increased by 100%. In the FOREIGN2 
scenario the proportionate skill differential is higher in the foreign-owned firm and 
the FOREIGN3 scenario keeps the same wages as DOMESTIC1 and increases the 
proportion of skilled and unskilled workers. Hence, GINI coefficients are calculated 
using data on average monthly wage of skilled and unskilled workers (columns 1 and 2) 
in one domestic-owned firm and three foreign-owned firms, weighted by the number 
of skilled and unskilled employees (columns 3 and 4) in each firm. 
No. of firms
Monthly wage of 
skilled worker (Euro)
Monthly wage of 
unskilled worker 
(Euro)
Number of employees 
with skilled wage
Number of employees 
with unskilled wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DOMESTIC 1 450 100 30 30
FOREIGN 1 900 200 30 30
FOREIGN 2 900 150 30 30
FOREIGN 3 450 100 60 40
Table 5 Simulation data on wages and employees on domestic and foreign owned firms
Table 6 reports the GINI coefficients first for the domestic-owned firm and then 
including foreign-owned firms. The average GINI coefficient for the domestic-owned 
firm (DOM1) is 0.32, increased by 25% when the first foreign-owned firm is included 
and being the same when adding FOREIGN2. This increase is due to a larger absolute 
proportionate wage skill differential in the foreign-owned firm. Comparing DOM1 with 
FOREIGN3 decreases the GINI coefficient to 0.29 due to the employment differential. 
These results indicate that the overall GINI coefficient may increase as a result of the 
increased skilled premium, holding other factors constant.
However, if a foreign-owned firm pays local wages (FOREIGN3) but employs a higher 
proportion of skilled workers, this actually lowers inequality. So there are two effects 
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of foreign-owned firms working in opposite directions, hence there is an ambiguous 
overall effect of foreign-owned firm’s entry on wage inequality. 
No. of firm GINI coefficient Skill differential
Employment 
differential
DOM1 0.32 350 0
DOM1+FOREIGN1 0.4 700 0
DOM1+FOREIGN1 +FOREIGN2 0.4 -50 0
DOM1+FOREIGN3 0.29 350 20
Table 6 Calculated GINI, skill and employment differentials for domestic and 
foreign-owned firms
Part B
Adjusting the above simulation according to data from the PCA (2009) survey, we have 
the following absolute proportionate skill and employment differential presented in 
Table 7. The foreign-owned firms (FOREIGN1) in Macedonia pay 25% wage premium 
for skilled and 37% for unskilled workers. So, the base GINI coefficient was calculated 
using DOMESTIC1 and FOREIGN1 data. Afterwards two changes were simulated: 
1) what happens to the GINI when a new foreign-owned firm enters with a larger 
absolute skill wage differential (FOREIGN2) and 2) what happens when a new foreign-
owned firm enters with the same wage premium as the original foreign-owned firm 
but with a higher proportion of skilled workers (FOREIGN3). Table 8 presents the 
results that indicate an increase of 27.3% when FOREIGN2 enters the market, however 
the GINI coefficient falls slightly when FOREIGN3 enters the market. This confirms 
the above results that there is an ambiguous effect of foreign-owned firm entry on 
wage inequality. Hence, in a country like Macedonia12, the likely effect of additional 
FDI would decrease the overall wage inequality if the ratio of more skilled workers 
increases. 
No. of firms
Monthly wage of 
skilled worker (Euro)
Monthly wage of 
unskilled worker 
(Euro)
Number of employees 
with skilled wage
Number of employees 
with unskilled wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DOMESTIC 1 422.11 139.85 175 110
FOREIGN 1 527.88 191.65 19 7
FOREIGN 2 1055.76 383.3 19 7
FOREIGN 3 527.88 191.65 38 7
Table 7 Simulation data on wages and employees on domestic and foreign owned firms according to 
PCA data
12 The mean Gini for the period from 1993 to 2008 is 0.28.
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No. of firm GINI coefficient
DOM1+ FOREIGN1 0.22
DOM1+FOREIGN1+FOREIGN2 0.28
DOM1+FOREIGN1 +FOREIGN2+FOREIGN3 0.27
Table 8 Calculated GINI for domestic and foreign-owned firms
To conclude, FDI is not likely to influence wages of all type of workers to the same 
extent (Te Velde, 2003). According to the skill-bias argument FDI inflows may have 
positive effects on domestic skilled wages as a result of the increased ‘international’ 
competition for such workers and changes in technology which raise the demand 
for skilled workers. This changing pattern of demand for labour is likely to have a 
negative effect on unskilled wages (Onaran and Stockhammer, 2007). The simulation 
analysis indicates that the effect of FDI inflows on labour market inequality is much 
more complex than previously assumed in the literature. Increased inflows of FDI 
could increase or reduce the GINI coefficient dependent upon country-specific factors 
and the type of FDI. In order to investigate these effects further, empirical research is 
required. 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the increased FDI flows, research into transition countries and 
especially Western Balkan countries has largely neglected the effects of foreign 
ownership on labour market inequality. There seems to be a general agreement on 
the impact of FDI on growth, whereas in relation to labour market inequality further 
investigation is needed to clarify the situation. As a result of technological and 
management expertise FDI may improve the level of wages in the host economies as 
well as working conditions and increase employment. Foreign-owned firms tend to 
be larger, more capital and skill intensive, introduce more up-to-date technology and 
pay higher wages accordingly. FDI is not likely to influence wages of all type of workers 
to the same extent. Using the GINI coefficient as the measure of wage inequality 
our simulation analysis indicates that the net effects of FDI on wage inequality will 
depend in part on country specific factors: how large are the differences in skilled and 
unskilled wages, the skill-intensity of employment in foreign-owned firms compared 
to domestic ones and the relative size of the foreign-owned sector. This simulation 
analyses suggest that wage inequality may increase as a result of the increased skill 
premium, holding other factors constant. However, if a foreign-owned firm pays 
the same wages as locally-owned firms, but employs a higher proportion of skilled 
workers, this actually lowers inequality. Hence, there is an ambiguous overall effect of 
foreign-owned firm’s entry on wage inequality. 
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Analysing the sectoral distribution the services sector accounted for most of inward 
FDI stock in all SEE countries up to 2012, however with substantial variations 
among countries. In Macedonia, foreign-owned firms enhanced services, such as in 
telecommunications and banking, introduced new technologies and machineries, 
improved export capacities through contract manufacturing and pay higher wages 
than domestic investors.
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